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Abstract          
Research shows that anxiety may relate to any or all of the following: goal conflict 
resolution; distraction, and the automatic detection of threat-related stimuli. To investigate 
these relationships we used a modified Stroop task where fearful and happy emotional target 
faces are overlaid with either emotionally neutral, emotionally congruent or emotionally 
incongruent distracting words. A trait anxiety related speed-accuracy trade-off seemed to 
primarily reduce accuracy during incongruent trials with target fearful faces overlaid with the 
emotionally conflicting word happy. We offer an explanation of this effect based upon 
theories of how positive stimuli and threat-related stimuli differentially affect information 
processing. Future studies should seek to verify how the anxiety related speed-accuracy 
trade-off mechanism is activated, and elucidate how and when positive stimuli affect anxiety 
more than threat-related stimuli do.  
 
Keywords:    Anxiety, conflict, distraction, emotion, attention, Stroop.  
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Theories of trait anxiety have proposed distinct, but conceptually-related, mediating 
mechanisms. Firstly, anxiety may be mediated by a biological behavioural inhibition system 
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which is responsible for the resolution of goal conflict (Gray & McNaughton, 2000). 
Secondly, attentional control theory (ACT) suggest that anxiety relates to increased cognitive 
interference, which is experienced as distraction (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos & Calvo, 
2007). Thirdly, anxiety has been related to the enhanced processing of threat-related stimuli 
(Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van Ijzendoorn, 2007; Beck & 
Clark, 1997; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Therefore, the day-to-
day experiences of those high in trait anxiety may be affected by the interaction between the 
level of threat monitoring, magnitude of cognitive interference (i.e., distraction), and an 
altered way of resolving conflicting approach and avoidance situations.  
 
Experimental neurocognitive research has shown that trait anxiety is related to the impaired 
reactivity of cognitive mechanisms that are mediated by the prefrontal cortex, when goal 
conflict resolution and the inhibition of distractor processing is required. These effects have 
been found when neutral distractors are used (Bishop, 2009), and when threat-related 
distractors are used (Bishop, Jenkins, & Lawrence, 2007). Bishop (2009) proposed that these 
findings may explain why clinical anxiety patients suffer daily problems with concentration. 
A widely used emotional distraction paradigm referred to as the emotional Stroop task 
requires participants to identify the font colour of threat-related words and neutral words. If 
the font colour of the threat-related words is identified slower than the font colour of the 
neutral words, a threat-related attentional bias is inferred. This bias is magnified in anxiety 
(for meta-analysis see Phaf & Kan, 2007).  
 
The emotional Stroop task has recently received a substantial paradigm modification. In this 
paradigm distracting emotional words (e.g., fear and happy) are overlaid upon pictures of 
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either fearful faces or happy faces. Participants are required to respond to the faces. The 
distracting emotional words are either congruent or incongruent with the emotional 
expressions of the target faces. Goal conflict is high during incongruent trials (e.g., a happy 
face with a fearful distractor word) as the distractor words may trigger their own response. 
Goal conflict is low during congruent trials as the distractor words trigger the same response 
as that of the target facial expression. A congruency effect is calculated as the reaction time 
(RT) or accuracy difference between the faster and more accurate responses to congruent 
trials and slower and less accurate responses to incongruent trials. Thus, this paradigm can be 
used to assess how trait anxiety affects attentional control in situations of emotional conflict. 
Etkin & Schatzberg (2011) and Etkin, Prater, Hoeft, Menon & Schatzberg (2010) used this 
paradigm including equal proportions of congruent and incongruent trials. The congruency 
effect was not related to levels of trait anxiety or clinical anxiety. These data are at odds with 
the proposed theoretical link between anxiety and goal-conflict resolution. However, Etkin 
and colleagues did not analyse whether anxiety selectively affected performance on either 
incongruent happy trials, or incongruent fearful trials.  
 
Krug & Carter (2010) also used this paradigm but they used fearful and neutral faces overlaid 
with the words fear or neutral, and included just 30% incongruent trials. Therefore, in this 
study goal conflict and distraction occurred less frequently. Trait anxiety still did not affect 
the congruency effect. However, high anxious participants were slower to respond to neutral 
faces overlaid with the distractor word fear, than fearful faces overlaid with the distractor 
word neutral. Moreover, low anxious participants showed the opposite pattern. Therefore 
these results favour an account of anxiety which tentatively suggests that high anxiety relates 
to increased automatic threat detection. Krug & Carter (2012) used the same task again. In a 
high conflict expectancy condition 65% of trials were incongruent, whereas in a low conflict 
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expectancy condition 35% of trials were incongruent. However, this time neither the 
congruency effects, nor performance during incongruent trials were correlated with trait 
anxiety.  
In the word-face Stroop studies discussed above, goal conflict was induced between facial 
and verbal emotional stimuli, with a view to quantifying how trait anxiety effects the 
cognitive control of emotion. These four studies make it clear that support for the three 
theories of anxiety discussed above was very inconsistent. It is possible that the task designs 
used did not cleanly measure the theoretical processes being discussed here. For example, in 
the real world emotional conflict/distraction may occur less frequently. Moreover, 
congruency effects in Stroop tasks are the sum of both facilitation effects and interference 
effects. Facilitation effects are measured as the improvement in performance for congruent 
trials relative to neutral trials, whereas interference effects are measured as the reduction in 
performance for incongruent trials relative to neutral trials (Goldfarb & Henik 2007). Koster, 
Crombez, Verschuere, & De Houwer (2004) have shown that both facilitation and 
interference effects also contribute to the congruency effect found in the dot probe paradigm. 
This suggests that the measurement of attentional facilitation and attentional interference may 
generalise across paradigms. The differential contributions of these effects were not assessed 
in the word-face Stroop studies discussed above. Thus, any specific trait anxiety effects on 
attentional facilitation or attentional interference were not determined.  
 
Decreasing the proportion of incongruent trials relative to congruent trials increased the 
magnitude of the congruency effect in the emotional word-face Stroop study by Krug & 
Carter (2012). Current theorising suggests that participants would have implicitly learned the 
correlations (contingencies) between the words and responses. Thus participants would have 
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learned to predict the response required based upon the distracting word (Schmidt & Besner, 
2008). Schmidt & Besner suggested that in Stroop tasks participants make speeded responses 
to high contingency congruent trials based upon response predictions. They proposed that 
participants selectively lower their response threshold for an expected response. Schmidt & 
Besner suggested that increased RT facilitation, but not increased RT interference, is what 
increases the magnitude of the RT congruency effect, when predominantly congruent trials 
are included. They also suggest that increased facilitation in accuracy occurs due to the same 
mechanism. Moreover, interference effects in accuracy for low contingency incongruent trials 
also occur due to the response threshold being lowered for the word when it was predictive. If 
this theoretical framework better describes proportion congruent effects in Stroop tasks, then 
this suggests that there is an extra neurocognitive mechanism that may be implicated, in 
addition to any conflict resolution, distraction, and threat detection mechanisms. Thus, any 
anxiety effects found might be based upon contingency learning and/or response threshold 
lowering.   
 
1.2 Purpose of study 
None of the word-face emotional Stroop studies discussed above used a design that combined 
conflicting fearful and happy stimuli with infrequent incongruent trials. Thus, we used a 
happy versus fear word-face Stroop task including very infrequent incongruent trials (17%), 
in an attempt to maximise the effect of emotional conflict during these trials. We included 
neutral word trials so we could explore whether trait anxiety differentially modulated how 
attentional facilitation or attentional interference contributed to the congruency effect.  
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Specifically, we used the above theories to predict that trait anxiety would impair cognitive 
performance during the very infrequent incongruent trials, resulting in either an anxiety 
related slowing in RTs and/or reduced accuracy for these trials (or an increased congruency 
effect). This prediction is based upon the suggestion that high anxiety is related to increased 
cognitive interference/distraction (Eysenck et al., 2007), and also the impaired prefrontal 
control of attention (Bishop, 2009; Bishop et al., 2007). We predicted that any anxiety effect 
upon incongruent trials would be magnified for incongruent trials consisting of happy faces 
overlaid with the word “fear” more so than for fearful faces overlaid with the word “happy”. 
We predicted this based on the theoretical view that distraction should be maximized in high 
anxiety, especially when the distracting stimuli are threat related (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; 
Beck & Clark, 1997; Eysenck et al., 2007; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 
1998). If found, this result would be consistent with the results of Krug & Carter (2010).  
 
2.1 Method 
 
2.2 Participants 
Participants (N = 77; 62 female) were recruited from Goldsmiths University of London, and 
had a mean age of 23.4 years (SD = 7). Of these, 68 were right-handed and 35 were 
psychology 1st year undergraduates, who took part in return for course credit. The rest were 
paid £5, and were students or staff from other departments. All gave informed written consent 
in accordance with standard ethical guidelines. The approximate sample size was chosen to 
allow 80% power for two-tailed tests at p=0.05, for correlations of 0.3. Such correlations are 
typical for personality-behaviour associations.  
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2.3 Psychometric measures 
Trait anxiety was assessed using the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI, Spielberger et al., 
1983).  
2.4 Stimuli 
The emotional faces used to create the Stroop stimuli were obtained from a standardised face 
stimuli set developed for research (NimStim; Tottenham et al., 2009). Two face stimulus sets 
were created using one male face, and one female face. This was an attempt to control for 
gender differences. Congruent stimuli were created by placing the distractor word “fear” or 
“happy” across the nose of the target fearful or happy faces, respectively. The mouths and 
eyes were not obscured.  Incongruent stimuli were created by placing the distractor words 
“fear” or “happy” over the top of the happy or fearful faces, respectively. Neutral stimuli 
were created by placing either the words “bowl” or “cellar” over the emotional faces. The 
overall picture dimensions were 65mm high and 53 mm wide, and were presented on a 15.5 
inch laptop screen. 
 
3.1 Procedure   
 
Participants were told that they would be presented with two facial emotion recognition tasks 
(i.e., one male block of trials and one female block of trials) with a short rest in-between. 
Participants were asked to sit as close to the screen as was comfortable for their eyes (typical 
viewing distance was approximately 70 cm). The task instructions were presented on the 
screen. To start each block the first screen instructed participants that they would have to 
judge the emotional expression showing on photos of happy or fearful faces. Participants 
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were then shown examples of the various stimulus combinations they might see and 
reminded to concentrate on the face and ignore the words. They were told to rest their index 
fingers over the responses keys (z and /) and to respond as fast as possible while maintaining 
high accuracy levels. They were verbally told that a high pitched tone following a response 
indicates a correct response, whereas a low pitched tone following a response indicates an 
incorrect response.  
 
The experimental stimuli were displayed until a response key was pressed. Unbeknown to the 
participants, at the beginning of each block, there were two of each neutral and incongruent 
trials, and 8 of each congruent trial included as practice trials; these were discarded and not 
analysed. The main experimental stimuli that followed consisted of 40 neutral trials, 40 
incongruent trials and 160 congruent trials (in each of the two blocks). The proportions of 
target happy trials and target fearful trials were kept equal. The trial type sequence was 
created using a random number generator, and was the same for all participants. We kept the 
sequence the same for all participants as this is an individual differences study, and we 
wanted as few uncontrolled variables as possible to vary across participants. We also used the 
same trial type sequence for each of the blocks. There were 240 non-practice trials in total in 
each block so we felt that there was no chance that using the same sequence in each block 
would cause any learning of the sequence of trial types. We counterbalanced the order of the 
2 blocks across participants. Each block lasted for approximately ten minutes. The left/right 
finger response key mappings were also counterbalanced. The data for each trial type in the 
two blocks was averaged prior to analysis. 
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4.1 Results 
 
4.2 Psychometric measurement 
Participants trait anxiety scores ranged from 20-70 (mean = 41.7, SD = 10.2). 
4.3 Reaction times 
RTs for correct trials (excluding trials where RT < 250 msecs and RT > 1000 msecs) were 
first subjected to a repeated measures 3 x 2 ANCOVA with factors of trial type (congruent 
versus neutral versus incongruent) and emotion (fearful face versus happy face) with 
standardised trait anxiety as the covariate. The descriptive statistics for the 6 stimulus types 
are shown in Table 1. 
 
TABLE 1  
 
The results of the within-subjects part of our ANCOVA directly address the theories being 
tested here as they reflect the effects of trait anxiety on the congruency effect and its 
components. The test of within-subjects effects showed that the main effect of trial type was 
significant (F[2,144]=15.1, p<0.001, η2=0.17). The critical finding here was that anxiety did 
not did not modulate the main effect of trial type (F[2,144]=1.6, p=0.21, η2=0.022). The 
effect of emotion was also non-significant (F[1,72]=1.23, p=0.27, η2=0.017), and critically 
did not interact with anxiety (F[1,72]=0.13, p=0.72, η2=0.002). The effect of trial type did not 
further interact with emotion (F[2,144]=0.46, p=0.63, η2=0.006), and there was no significant 
three way interaction between trial type, emotion and anxiety (F[2,144]=0.29, p=0.75, 
η2=0.004).  
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We conducted three planned comparisons to clarify the main effect of trial type using an 
adjusted significance level of 0.05/3. A one-way ANCOVA with standardised trait anxiety as 
the covariate showed that congruent trials were responded to significantly faster than 
incongruent trials (F[1,72]=22.1, p<0.001, η2=0.235). This effect was unrelated to anxiety 
(F[1,72]=0.09, p=0.76, η2=0.001). This confirms that anxiety was uncorrelated with the 
congruency effect (incongruent RT minus congruent RT). Our next one-way ANCOVA with 
standardised trait anxiety as the covariate showed that congruent trials were responded to 
significantly faster than neutral trials (F[1,72]=25.9, p<0.001, η2=0.265). This effect was 
unrelated to anxiety (F[1,72]=2.3, p=0.13, η2=0.031). This confirms that anxiety was 
uncorrelated with the facilitation effect (neutral RT minus congruent RT). Our final one-way 
ANCOVA with standardised trait anxiety as the covariate showed that incongruent trials were 
not responded to significantly slower than neutral trials (F[1,72]=1.4, p<0.711, η2=0.002). 
This comparison was unrelated to anxiety (F[1,72]=2.6, p=0.112, η2=0.035). This confirms 
that anxiety was uncorrelated with the overall non-significant interference effect (incongruent 
RT minus neutral RT).  
 
The results of the between-subjects part of the ANCOVA revealed interesting significant 
results. The test of between-subjects effects was significant (F[1,72]=6.45 p=0.01, η2=0.082), 
indicating that anxiety was significantly correlated with RTs across the whole experiment 
(the correlation value was r = -0.3). This is shown in figure 1. We confirmed that this 
negative correlation was present for both target fearful faces (r= -0.29, p=0.012), and target 
happy faces (r= -0.31, p=0.007) considered separately. These correlations are significant at 
an adjusted significance level of 0.025. 
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FIGURE 1  
 
 
4.4 Proportion correct  
We analysed the proportion correct for each of the trial types (excluding trials where RT < 
250 msecs and RT > 1000 msecs) using a 3 x 2 ANCOVA with factors of trial type 
(congruent versus neutral versus incongruent) and emotion (fearful face versus happy face) 
with standardised trait anxiety as the covariate. The descriptive statistics for the 6 stimulus 
types are shown in Table 2.   
 
TABLE 2  
 
The test of within-subjects effects showed that the main effect of trial type was significant 
(F[2,144]=24.6, p<0.001, η2=0.255). Anxiety significantly modulated the trial type effect 
(F[2,144]=3.0, p=0.054, η2=0.040). There was no significant main effect of emotion 
(F[1,72]=1.06, p=0.307, η2=0.014), and no anxiety interaction (F[1,72]=1.70, p=0.194, 
η2=0.023). The non-significant emotion versus anxiety interaction shows that anxiety does 
not correlate with the accuracy difference score between happy and fearful target trials. The 
effect of trial type significantly interacted with emotion (F[2,144]=4.74, p=0.010, η2=0.062), 
but there was no significant three-way interaction between trial type, emotion and anxiety 
(F[2,144]=0.30, p=0.74, η2=0.004).  
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We followed up the anxiety by trial type effect using three one-way ANCOVAs with 
standardised trait anxiety as the covariate. Here we adopt an adjusted significance level of 
0.05/3. A traditional congruency effect was evident as congruent trials were responded to 
more accurately than incongruent trials (F[1,72]=27.2 p<0.001, η2=0.274). Anxiety was 
related to this difference in accuracy at a trend level (F[1,72]=3.67 p=0.059, η2=0.048). The 
sign and value of the correlation was r=0.22. Thus, as anxiety increased so did the 
congruency effect. Congruent trials were not responded to significantly more accurately than 
neutral trials (F[1,72]=0.10 p=0.749, η2=0.001), and this comparison did not interact with 
anxiety (F[1,72]=0.37 p=0.543, η2=0.005). Therefore, there were no facilitation effects in the 
accuracy data. However, responses to neutral trials were more accurate than responses to 
incongruent trials (F[1,72]=27.56 p<0.001, η2=0.277). This interference effect was not 
significantly related to anxiety, although it could be considered a weak trend (F[1,72]=2.85 
p=0.096, η2=0.038).   
 
As the anxiety and trial type analyses focus upon the difference between trial types we 
wished to determine if anxiety correlated with accuracy during each of the 3 trial types 
separately. Trait anxiety was related to reduced accuracy for incongruent trials (r= -0.26, 
p=0.024). This can be interpreted as a trend against an adjusted significance level of 0.05/3.  
Anxiety was not significantly correlated with accuracy to congruent trials (r= -0.12, p=0.307) 
or neutral trials (r= -0.17, p=0.144).  
 
As with the RT analysis, the test of between-subjects effects revealed an interesting and 
significant result, not directly predicted by the theories under investigation (F[1,72]=4.79 
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p=0.032, η2=0.062). Thus, anxiety was significantly correlated with proportion correct across 
the whole experiment (the correlation value was r = -0.25; as shown in figure 2). Thus the 
overall speeding in RTs by high anxious participants also seemed to result in an overall 
reduction in accuracy.  
 
FIGURE 2  
 
We then verified whether both averaged fear targets and averaged happy targets, or if only 
one of the averaged target emotion types were implicated in this anxiety related reduction in 
accuracy. Here we adopt an adjusted significance level of 0.025. Correlations showed that 
anxiety negatively and significantly correlated with proportion correct for fear trials (r= -
0.29, p=0.013), but not happy trials (r= -0.16, p=0.185). We wished to determine which of 
the fear trials were driving the anxiety and fear trial correlation. We conducted exploratory 
correlations between anxiety and the three fear trial types (i.e., incongruent, neutral and 
congruent). As figure 3 shows, anxiety was more robustly correlated with incongruent fear 
trials (r= -0.28, p=0.017), than neutral fear trials (r= -0.17, p=0.149), or congruent fear trials 
(r= -0.17, p=0.138).  
 
FIGURE 3  
 
4.5 Speed-accuracy trade-off 
A reliable speed accuracy trade-off was present, as overall RTs correlated positively with 
overall proportion correct (r= 0.39, p=0.001). As trait anxiety was significantly correlated 
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with both an overall decrease in RTs, and an overall decrease in accuracy, we considered that 
this was likely to reflect an anxiety related speed-accuracy trade-off. To verify this we 
correlated trait anxiety with the overall proportion correct across the experiment whilst 
controlling for overall RTs. When partialling out the effects of RTs, trait anxiety was no 
longer significantly correlated with proportion correct (r= -0.15, p=0.20). Moreover, the 
correlation between trait anxiety and RTs was no longer reliable when controlling for 
accuracy (r= -0.22, p=0.06). We suggest that these partial correlations indicate an anxiety 
related speed-accuracy trade-off.  
 
5.1 Discussion 
We used a word-face emotional Stroop task which produced a robust RT congruency effect 
and RT facilitation effect, but no RT interference effect. Our accuracy analysis showed a 
robust congruency effect, robust interference effect, but no facilitation effect. Our RT data 
lends some support to the contingency learning theory proposed by Schmidt and Besner 
(2008), which predicts that the RT congruency effect in contingency biased designs (i.e., 
those including predominantly congruent trials) will be driven mainly by facilitation not 
interference. Our accuracy data only partially supports the contingency learning account, as 
although the expected interference effects were found, the expected facilitation effects were 
not found. In other words, we found reduced accuracy for incongruent trials relative to 
neutral trials, but no increase in accuracy for congruent trials relative to neutral trials.  
However, Schmidt and Besner used equiprobable contingency trials (50% Incongruent and 
50% congruent) to compare to high and low contingency trials (and thus separate facilitation 
and interference effects differently). In contrast, we used neutral word trials (in the same 
proportion as incongruent trials) that were not predictive or emotionally conflicting.   
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In the present study, the effect of anxiety predicted overall for incongruent trials, was not 
found for RTs, but was marginally present for accuracy. Thus, our initial analyses suggested 
that trait anxiety was not reliably related to increased cognitive interference/distraction, 
which is somewhat inconsistent with ACT (Eysenck et al., 2007). Moreover, we found no 
evidence of an anxiety related attentional bias towards threat-related stimuli, which is 
inconsistent with several theoretical perspectives on anxiety (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Beck & 
Clark, 1997; Eysenck et al., 2007; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998). In 
contrast to the above, the present study found that trait anxiety was related to faster RTs 
across the whole paradigm, which was related to an overall reduction in accuracy (i.e., a 
speed accuracy trade-off). However, further analyses suggested that there was actually a more 
specific effect of anxiety upon cognitive interference/distraction and emotion processing. 
Anxiety was robustly related to reduced accuracy for fearful trials, which seemed primarily 
due to the incongruent fearful trials (a fearful target face overlaid with the word happy). We 
now offer a novel explanation of the effects of anxiety upon the speed accuracy trade-off, and 
the resulting decrement in accuracy for incongruent fearful trials.  
 
The finding of an anxiety-related speed-accuracy trade-off is in alignment with the results 
reported by Basten, Stelzel, & Fiebach (2011). They found that high anxiety was related to a 
trend towards an overall speeding in RTs, and increased errors in a neutral Stroop task. It is 
possible that both the present study, and the study carried out by Basten et al., may have 
tapped into an anxiety related speed-accuracy trade-off mechanism. The question remains 
open as to what triggered the speed-accuracy trade-off, and what made it greater in high 
anxious participants, in the present study. Van Veen, Krug, and Carter (2008) proposed that 
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when a stimulus is perceived, evidence is processed that relates to each possible response. 
They suggest that neural activity relevant to making a possible response will start from 
baseline and gradually increase until a response threshold is reached. Schmidt and Besner 
(2008) suggest that in Stroop tasks participants make speeded responses to high contingency 
trials based upon response predictions. They suggest that participants lower a response 
threshold for expected responses, but not for any alternative possible responses. They also 
suggest that increased interference during low contingency trials will produce more errors, as 
the response threshold was reduced for the word because it was previously predictive.  
 
In the present study anxiety did not modulate any RT facilitation effects for congruent trials. 
Thus we suggest that the contingency learning effect was of the same magnitude at all levels 
of anxiety. However, we suggest that contingency learning may still have been the trigger for 
the speed-accuracy trade-off, and its increase in high anxious participants. The anxiety related 
speed-accuracy trade-off was much stronger in the present study than the trend in the study 
by Basten et al. (2011). In their study their results may have reflected an underlying response 
tendency that was not yet fully triggered. Indeed, in their study no contingency learning 
would have been present as congruent and incongruent trials were equal in proportions.  
 
In the present study the main detrimental effects of the anxiety related speed-accuracy trade-
off seemed to be a reduction in accuracy during incongruent trials requiring responses to 
target fearful faces (overlaid with the distractor word happy). The question is, why in the 
present study was it harder for high anxious participants to suppress responses to happy 
words than fear words during incongruent trials? We suggest that it is the combination of two 
theoretical factors that can explain these results. Firstly, a general attentional bias to positive 
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stimuli may occur at an initial attentional orienting stage of information processing (Pool, 
Brosch, Delplanque, & Sander 2016). Secondly, anxiety may specifically relate to a difficulty 
in disengaging attention from threat-related stimuli that occurs at a later stage of information 
processing (e.g., Phaf & Kan, 2007; Yiend & Mathews, 2001).  
 
According to these two perspectives, in the present study all participants’ attention to the 
target happy faces and happy distractor words would have been affected at an early orienting 
stage of information processing.  However, a delayed attentional disengagement from target 
fearful faces and fearful distractor words, by high anxious participants, would occur at a 
slightly later stage of information processing. In the present study the initial orienting to 
happy words, their learned contingencies, and the anxiety related speed-accuracy trade-off 
could have made it particularly hard for those high in anxiety, to inhibit responding to the 
happy words. This may explain the anxiety related decrement in accuracy for incongruent 
fearful trials. In short, the target fearful faces may not have had the chance to affect attention 
(and thus the responses) of those high in anxiety, if the responses to happy words were 
prepared exceptionally quickly.  
 
In the present study anxiety did not relate to reduced accuracy during incongruent trials 
consisting of target happy faces overlaid with fearful words. We suggest that the fearful 
words should have affected the attention of high anxious participants at the later 
disengagement stage. However, in all participants the happy target faces would have affected 
attention at the initial orienting stage. Thus, even though responses to the fearful words would 
have been contingency learned, it may have been slightly easier for high anxious participants 
to respond to the target happy face by inhibiting responding to the fearful word (during 
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incongruent happy trials), than it would be for them to respond to the target fearful face by 
inhibiting responding to the happy word (during incongruent fear trials).  In short, we suggest 
that the different effects of the two types of incongruent trials, upon those high in anxiety, 
was due to differences in when and how their attention was affected by the differentially 
valenced emotional stimuli.  
 
5.2 Limitations 
In the present study female participants outnumbered male participants. A lot of research with 
UK psychology student samples has this bias, as females outnumber males on UK 
psychology degrees three or four to one. We are not overly concerned by this issue in the 
present study for two reasons. Firstly, MacLeod (1991) reviewed Stroop studies spanning half 
a century and reported that research has not found any reliable gender difference in Stroop 
task performance. Secondly, Hoffmann, Kessler, Eppel, Rukavina, & Traue (2010) have 
shown that there is no gender difference in recognition accuracy for salient emotional facial 
expressions. 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
To conclude, we used a contingency biased emotional word-face Stroop task that resulted in 
an anxiety-related speed-accuracy trade-off. This resulted in an anxiety-related reduction in 
accuracy for incongruent trials. However, anxiety seemed to be mainly related to increased 
interference by positive emotional words as opposed to increased interference by threat-
related words. Future studies should seek to ascertain if the anxiety related speed-accuracy 
trade-off is replicable, and further explain how this mechanism is triggered. In addition, 
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future studies should seek to further elucidate how and when positive emotional stimuli might 
affect high trait anxious people more than threat-related stimuli do.  
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Tables & Figures: 
 
Table 1: Mean reaction times, 95% confidence intervals (95%CI) and standard errors of 
the mean (SE) for each stimulus type. All are given in milliseconds. 
 Happy target faces  Fearful target faces 
        
Trial type Mean RT 95% CI SE Trial type Mean RT 95% CI SE 
        
Congruent 486 472-499 7 Congruent 
 
488 574-502 6 
Neutral 496 481-511 7 Neutral  
 
496 583-512 7 
Incongruent  495 479-511 8 Incongruent  500 484-516 8 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The negative correlation (r= -0.3) between standardised trait anxiety and overall 
RTs. 
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Table 2: Mean proportion correct (Prop/C), 95% confidence intervals (95%CI) and 
standard errors of the mean (SE) for each stimulus type. 
 Happy target faces  Fearful target faces 
        
Trial type Prop/C 95% CI SE Trial type Prop/C 95% CI SE 
        
Congruent 0.97 0.97-0.98 0.003 Congruent 
 
0.97 0.96-0.97 0.004 
Neutral 0.97 0.96-0.97 0.004 Neutral  
 
0.97 0.97-0.98 0.004 
Incongruent  0.95 0.93-0.96 0.007 Incongruent  0.94 0.92-0.95 0.007 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The negative correlation (r= -0.25) between standardised trait anxiety and 
overall accuracy. 
 
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
0.88 0.9 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.98 1
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
is
ed
 t
ra
it
 a
n
x
ie
ty
Proportion corrrect
The relationship between trait anxiety 
and overall accuracy 
25 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The negative correlation (r= -0.28) between standardised trait anxiety and 
accuracy for incongruent fear trials. 
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